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The 1985  Farm Bill is  currently  being debated  as  the U.S.  agricultural
sector  is  experiencing  very adverse  conditions.  Production expenses  are
rising and farm output  prices are  falling.  As  farm asset values  fall,  debt
to  asset  ratios  are  rising and  financial  stress  is  wide spread.  The poli-
tical  debate is  diverse  ranging from market oriented  farm bill  proposals  to
parity  pricing with manditory  marketing quotas.  The  outcome  of  this  public
policy debate will certainly  affect many individuals  as  early as  1986  and
will clearly determine the  structure  and direction  of  american agricultural
policy well into the next  decade.
The objectives  of  this  paper  are two  fold.  The first  is  to  introduce
readers to an analytical system which allows  us  to estimate and  predict  the
major elements  of Minnesota's  farm economy from year  to year based upon a
comprehensive  economic and statistical model  of  total U.S.  agriculture.
The second objective is  to employ  this  system to project  the behavior of
Minnesota's agriculture under several  possible policy  regimes  which might
emerge from  the current political process  as  the  1985  Farm Bill.
As general background  to  the  specific analysis  and projections,  some
comments  about  the political process surrounding agricultural legislation
are presented.  Then we  look  at  the major  farm  bill proposals  now under
more  or  less serious  consideration.  Next  we examine  the  models  employed in
the  analyses, and  finally we present specific projections  for  the Minnesota
farm economy  as  it  might  respond to  various  types  of  national agricultural
policy.-2-
THE  1985 FARM BILL DEBATE
The 1985 Farm Bill is  currently being debated  as  part of  the quadren-
nial farm and food stamp  omnibus legislation.  Congress has  enacted farm
legislation every four  years since  1973  in  the year following  the presiden-
tial elections.  The  1985  Farm Bill  is  being debated under conditions  of
high real interest  rates,  an  extremely strong dollar  overseas, high  debt  to
asset  ratios and low  farm prices.  In addition,  the current  debate is
strongly  influenced by  the  following:
a) general economic  policies,  including  the  large federal deficit,
b) sagging foreign trade,  including a large  current  trade deficit,  and
c) the Congressional Budget Act of  1974.
The U.S.  agricultural sector  is  not  isolated from the general and
world economies.  As  the money supply  tightened and the  federal  deficit
grew, the effects  of  higher interest  rates  and  a strong dollar  created new
and serious  problems  for the  agricultural sector  -- production costs  rose
and export  demand fell.  The immediate impact  of  high interest  rates  and
reduced export  demand has  been lower  cash receipts  from farm marketings,
lower net  farm income,  and  a large  and uneven debt burden that is
threatening insolvency for  many farmers.
The other driving  force in  the current farm bill debate  is  the  budget
act  of  1974  (P.L. 94-344)  and  the  growing federal deficit.  This measure
was enacted  by  Congress  to  constrain  federal spending by using budget
targets.  The  act works  through  two  budget  resolutions;  one  in the House
and one in  the Senate.  The budget  resolutions set  targets  for  revenues,
spending, and  the  deficit.  When a budget  resolution  is  passed,  the House
and Senate agriculture committees meet  to  decide how  to  change  existing-3-
farm legislation so  that  it  conforms with the new budget limits.  Once  the
agricultural committees reconcile their  differences and agree upon the
changes,  the recommendations  are  then passed on  to  the budget committee
which consolidates  all of  the changes  into one  farm bill.  Then it  goes
back  to  the House and Senate for a final vote.
A bill must pass  both the House and Senate  in identical form before it
can be  sent to  the President.  If  signed by  the  President,  it  becomes  law.
However, if  the  cost  of  the legislation exceeds  the budget limits  set  forth
in the  budget  resolution or  if  the provisions of  the bill  are unsuitable to
the President, he may veto it.
The budget  process will have a very strong influence on  the  outcome  of
the  1985  farm bill  as  the agriculture committees,  on  the  one hand, attempt
to pass  farm bill legislation that will help assist  their agricultural
constituents  and  the budget  committees, on  the  other, attempt  to  curtail
rising government expenditures.-4-
FARM BILL PROPOSALS
Since the opening of  the  99th Congress,  twelve or more farm bills have
been introduced to  replace the  1981  Farm Bill  by  suspending or rescinding
permanent legislation.  If  a farm bill  is  not  signed into  law by  the
President  this year, then  the  farm program will revert back  to  the per-
manent legislation  of  the 1940s.  This  legislation authorizes farm prices
to  be  set at  75-90% of historic parity and exhibits  little ability to
control output.  Most farm legislation in the  recent  past has  suspended
rather than rescinded  (repealed) permanent  legislation.  However, the
Reagan administration's  proposal calls for  rescinding permanent legislation
and replacing it with a 15  year program.  Most other proposals  call for
suspending permanent  legislation from 4 to 8 years.
The farm bills  introduced in  the 99th Congress are all distinct  from
one  another, but most reflect a radical departure  from the  1977  and  1981
Farm Acts  whereby formulas for  loan rates specified minimums,  and target
prices were set  for  the duration of  the  act.  A majority of  the recently
proposed bills  tie price and income support  levels  to  market prices.  This
provides  the Administration with more year  to year program flexibility  for
responding  to excess supply  conditions.  It  also  reduces  the kind of  uncer-
tain budget exposure which previous farm legislation has  displayed.
A detailed presentation of  each of  the proposals is  beyond the  scope
of  this  report.  However, a brief description of  the major proposals
follows.
Administration Bill
The Reagan Administration's  farm bill,  the Agricultural Adjustment Act
of  1985  (AAA85) (H.R. 1420-S.501),  is  an attempt by  the Administration to-5-
reduce significantly  the role of  the  federal government in commodity
markets.  It  provides  a relatively rapid transition to  a market determined
set  of  loan  rates and deficiency payments.  The AAA85 sets  the  loan  rate
for wheat, feed grains,  and soybeans  at  75  percent  of  the national  average
farm price  of  the three immediately preceeding crop years,  with no minimum
specified.  Loans would accrue interest at  a rate set  by  the  Secretary and
are  to  be repayed within nine  months after  the  loan application  date.
Target prices  for  the previously mentioned crops would  be  set  at  a
declining percent of  the  3-year moving national average  farm price  that  the
loan rate  is  based on.  They would be  100%  of  the  national average  in
1986/87, and would decline 5 percent  thereafter to 75  percent  in  1991/92.
Deficiency  payments would be  based on the  difference between the  target
price and the actual annual average  farm price,  rather than  the  average
price  of  the first five months  of  the marketing year as  in  the 1981  Farm
Bill.  The USDA has estimated loan rates under the AAA85 proposal for
1986/87  to be  about $3-2 per bushel for  corn, $2.55  for wheat,  and $4.85
for soybeans.  Likewise, USDA has estimated target  prices under the AAA85
proposal for  1986/87 to  be  approximately $3.40  per bushel  for wheat  and
$2.83  for corn.
The AAA85  includes a voluntary acreage reduction  provision  (ARP)
whereby  farmers would be  required to set  aside a fixed percent  of  their
base for conservation use in  order to  be eligible  for program benefits.
Producers would not  receive diversion payments  on acres  set aside.  The ARP
would be  15%  in 1986,  10%  in  1987,  5% in 1988,  with no  supply controls
thereafter.  The acreage  base would be  determined by  the  average of  actual
plannings for  the previous  three years.-6-
The AAA85 would set  dairy price supports at  $11.60 per  cwt  for  1986,
and would allow the Secretary  to reduce  the price support  $.50  per cwt if
Government purchases are  greater than 5 billion pounds  on April 1,
1986,  and January 1, 1987.  After Oct.  1, 1987,  the dairy program would
employ a direct payment program based on market forces.
Finally, the AAA85 also contains  a provision for a 15  year program
that would rescind  (repeal) permanent legislation.  This would in  effect do
away with the possibility of  farm programs  reverting back  to  the permanent
legislation of  the 30's and 40's.
Marketing Loan Program
An alternative  to  the Administration's  proposal is  the marketing loan
program, or variable  loan repayment proposal (Congressional Record, Vol.
131,  No.  18,  S1840,S877).  A common  theme in most  of  these proposals
involves  loans  to farmers  at predetermined rates which can be  repaid  at  the
free market price or the  loan price, whichever is  lower.  The marketing
loan program would provide agriculture with a more gradual transition to
the  free market than would  the administration bill, and would allow market
prices to  float at world levels,  thereby stimulating exports.
The marketing loan program also would discontinue government removals
through CCC aquisitions  and  the  farmer held reserve  by  discontinuing the
use of  non-recourse loans  (farmers would have  to pay  back the loan  in cash
only;  they  cannot  forfeit  their grain) and  by  lowering release prices  to
loan rate  levels.  The market  loan program would hold net  farm income
constant by  freezing loan rates,  target prices,  and  reserve entry loan
rates at predetermined levels.  The acreage base would continue to  be
determined as  with the  1981  Farm Bill.  Excess  capacity would be  managed by
the  use of  acreage set-asides.-7-
Farm Bureau Bill
The Farm Bureau proposal  (H.R. 1965)(S.908)  is similar to  the AAA85
proposal  in that  it  ties the  loan rate  to market  forces.  Loan rates  for
wheat and feed grains would be  nonrecourse in nature  (grain could be  for-
feited to  the CCC  as payment  in  full) and would be equal  to  75%  of  a 5-year
moving average national farm price.  To  compute  this  average, one would
take  the national prices  from the previous five years,  drop  the  highest  and
lowest  value,  take the  simple average of  the  remaining three years and  then
take  75%  of  it.  There would be no minimum loan  rates,  but  the maximum
adjustment up or down would be  limited to  10%  in any one year.  The USDA
has estimated that'loan rates  in 1986/87 under this  proposal would be  $2.97
per  bushel for wheat,  and  $2.30  for  corn.
The Farm Bureau bill would set  target  prices  for  1986/87  at  $4.38  per
bushel for wheat and  $3.03  for  corn.  Target  prices  in 1987/88 would be
equal  to 110%  of  the average price  used to  calculate the loan  rate  and
changes from the previous  year could  not exceed  5%.
Acreage reductions would be  set  by  the Secretary when wheat  or  feed
grain carryover is greater than 4% of world demand.  Producers would also
be  paid  to divert  land,  receiving 50%  of  their diversion payments at
signup.
The Farm Bureau proposal also would tie dairy  price supports  to  market
prices  as well.  The  support price would  be  set  at  90%  of  a 3-year moving
average of  the  all-milk farm price, with adjustments made based on billions
of  pounds of  net  CCC  removals  (i.e.,  the greater the CCC  removals,  the
greater the adjustment downward).  Starting on April  1, 1986,  the  Secretary
could  adjust  the  dairy support  price  by no more  than 3% for any  6-month
period under this  proposal.-8-
Boschwitz/Boren Bill
The Boschwitz/Boren bill.  or the Family Farm Protection and Full
Production Act  (S.1041), is  an eight  year farm bill that would establish a
direct payment system to  protect farm income while the U.S.  regains  its
competitive position in world markets.  This bill has  three main goals:
a)  to protect  farm income during the several difficult years ahead,
b)  to promote  full production and to  let  farmers make production
decisions based on economic signals, not  on government programs,
and
c)  to make U.S. products competitive abroad.
Under the Boschwitz/Boren bill,  loan  rates would be  reduced dramati-
cally beginning in 1986/87  to  offset  the appreciation of  the U.S.  dollar
since  1981.  This would allow our  exports  to  be more competitive overseas
(a stronger U.S.  dollar increases  the price  that  overseas  countries must
pay in  their currency to  import U.S.  products).  Loan rates would be  set at
$2.20 per  bushel for wheat and $1.90  for corn.  In  1987,  the Secretary may
lower loan rates  10%  if  the market price  of  the previous year  is within 5%
of  the  loan rate.  This  reduction is required of  the Secretary if  the
market price of  the  previous 2 years is within 5% of  the  loan  rate  and if
the  loan rate was not  adjusted  downward in  the previous year.  The
Secretary would be allowed to  raise  the loan rate up to  5% if  market  con-
ditions  over the  2 preceding years warranted it  and if  such an increase
would not jeopardize  the competitive position of U.S.  agriculture  in world
markets.
In conjunction with lower  loan rates  the proposal uses transition
payments  to provide farmers with an adequate cash flow and to  protect  farm-9-
income.  The transition payment  is  formulated to  guarantee farmers  at  least
as  much income above variable  costs  as  they received in 1985.  The payment
rate for  1986/87 would be  $1.42  per bushel for wheat, and $0.94 on corn.
Therefore, the loan rate and transition payment together would guarantee
participating farmers  $3.62  per bushel  for wheat,  and $2.84  for corn in
1986/87.  This  compares with  target  price protection under, say,  the  Farm
Bureau proposal of  $4.38 per  bushel for wheat and  $3.03  for  corn.  The
transition payments  operate  on a sliding  scale to  target  assistance to
family-sized farm operations;  transition payments would be  gradually
reduced over time  as  the farm economy moves  more closely to a free market
environment.  There would be no annual diversions  or  set-asides.
Transition payments would be made  on  the  farmer's entire  crop base, whether
he planted or  not.
In addition  to  the income protection provisions,  the  bill would
establish an export promotion program that would
a) Establish a "Green Dollar" scheme to  increase exports using CCC
stocks  as a bonus  to exporters, and
b) Mandate a 20  percent  reduction in CCC  stocks  each year via dona-
tions  or programs  that  provde U.S.  commodities  to Third World countries.
The  transition payment  concept  also is  extended to  a proposed dairy
program.  Under this provision, transition payments would be  made quarterly
at the  rate  of  $1.50  per hundred weight  (cwt).  The dairy support  price,  or
CCC purchase price, would  be set  at  $10.60 per  cwt,  for a total payment  of
$12.10  per cwt.  The transition payment would be  made  at  100  percent  of  the
calculated amount  ($1.50  per  cwt)  in 1986.  Then it would be no lower  than
92  percent in  1987,  80 percent in  1988,  65 percent  in  1989,  and 50  percent-10-
in 1990.  After 1990,  the Secretary would have the authority  to implement
further income support payments.
Harkin/Alexander Bill
The Harkin/Alexander Bill, otherwise known as  the Farm Policy Reform
Act,  is  a proposed bill aimed at  immediately boosting  net  farm income while
cutting farm-program costs.  According to Senator Tom Harkin  (D-Iowa),  the
bill has  five major goals:
1)  to immediately increase net  farm income,
2)  to  strengthen existing conservation efforts,
3)  to align a restricted supply with demand,
4)  to  allow farmers  to determine, via a referendum, whether or  not to
have a mandatory supply management  program, and
5)  to  enhance our  role as  a reliable partner in international trade.
The program would require  that,  subject  to  a producer referendum, man-
ditory production quotas  be  imposed.  These quotas would be  established so
as  to  reduce  output sufficiently that high, parity-based farm prices would
prevail in the market.  Producers would be  required to set  aside  15%  of
their base acreage, with larger operators  setting aside  a progressively
larger amount of  their base  in years  of  excess supplies.  Farmers' base
acreage would be  equal  to any  acreage planted  to wheat,  soybeans  and feed
grains in  the last  four years.
Target prices  and related deficiency payments would be eliminated
under this  bill and would be  replaced with higher parity-based  loan rates.
The  elimination of  deficiency and diversion payments would drastically
reduce farm program costs  from current  levels.  The proposed loan rates
would provide a "parity price floor"  and would insure  farmers higher cash-11-
receipts from the market.  Loan rates  for 1986 would be  equal  to $5.21  per
bushel for wheat, $3.71  for corn,  and  $9.10  for  soybeans.  The loan  rates
would be  increased two  parity index points  per year until the eleventh year
of  the program, when price support  loan rates  would reach 90  percent  of
parity.
This  bill assumes  that  enough acreage  can be  diverted from production
so  that  production will equal demand at  the higher support prices.
However, if resulting production is  not  reduced sufficiently and  market
prices  fall below  the support price,  the cost  of  the program will rise
substantially as  farmers  forfeit their grain to  the Commodity Credit
Corporation.
The bill would also authorize  the Secretary to  establish a 30  million
acre conservation  reserve by  entering into contracts  of  5 years or more
with specific producers in order to  remove highly erodable land from
production.
The Harkin/Alexander bill would attempt  to eliminate  the possibility
of  increased grain imports  by  instructing  the Secretary  to utilize existing
laws  to  the maximum extent practicable.  This  bill would not  be workable  if
the market was  flooded with foreign imports attracted by  the higher market
prices.  Under this  scenario, imports would flood  the market, market  prices
would fall and  farmers would forfeit  on their loans.  The bill would also
attempt to expand exports  by utilizing a $500 million annual intermediate
credit  program, increase P.L.  480 funding and  related food aid requirements
for needy nations.-12-
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES
FOR MINNESOTA
Statistical analysis  of  the effects  of various  possible farm programs
on Minnesota agriculture was  conducted, for  this  paper, by means  of a new,
linked system of  equations which  tie  the  behavior of Minnesota's  farm econ-
omy  to factors affecting the  national farm sector.
The  foundation of  these calculations  is  a large,  comprehensive
national model  of  the U.S.  farm economy, which is  maintained and managed  in
the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute  (FAPRI) located  at  the
University of Missouri  and  Iowa State University.  This model  is  capable of
providing commodity-by-commodity estimates of  the major price  and quantity'
elements  in the  national farm sector under a variety  of possible farm poli-
cies.  As  an adjunct  to this national model, we have developed an addi-
tional  series  of  equations which link the  behavior of  this  national model
specifically to Minnesota's  agricultural sector.  Hence, we  can  trace and
project  the effects of  various policies upon the  national  farm economy, and
then follow those  effects  into Minnesota.
The FAPRI Policy Model
The FAPRI  annual agricultural policy model has  components  for each of
the major commodities.  These  include  the  crops component  (wheat, feed
grains,  soybeans,  cotton and  rice)  and the  livestock component  (beef, pork,
and poultry).  Each of  the  commodity components  consists  of behavioral
equations for production, stocks,  exports,  imports,  final consumption and,
if  appropriate,  consumption of  the commodities  as  intermediate products
(i.e.  corn as  feed).  These behavioral equations  are mathematical relations
reflecting  the  use  of economics,  statistics,  and  past data  to  describe  the-13-
behavior of  producers and  consumers  in the agricultural sector.  Sometimes
these equation systems  are called econometric models.
Figure 1 illustrates  the general scheme of  the FAPRI Model.  It  is  a
simultaneous economic model, meaning the  commodity components are  solved
together  for prices and quantities reflecting the  interactions or  linkages
that  exist between certain commodities.  For example, livestock  prices
affect the demand for  feed grains,  while feed grain prices influence
investment and production decisions in the  livestock sector, which then
affects livestock  prices.  These  linkages across  and between  commodity
markets are especially  important  in evaluating the  full impact of  alter-
native agricultural policies.  For  example, agricultural policies have a
direct  impact  on  the  crops market  and an indirect  impact  on livestock
markets.  Similarly, both domestic and  export markets  are affected.
The FAPRI model includes  variables and information about  the general
U.S.  and world economies,  and how  they affect  the U.S.  agricultural  sector.
These variables  are  termed exogenous  to  the system, which means  they are
not solved for  by  the model  but are  rather assumed.  Likewise,  there are
various non-economic exogenous variables which affect  the models  solution
and must  therefore be assumed.  Farm policy legislation  is a non-economic
force  that  impacts  greatly on  the  agricultural  economy  and must be
accounted for in  the model.  Since FAPRI  does  not have  the capability of
forecasting general U.S.  and World economic variables and predicting the
outcome  of  the  1985 farm bill,  the model  is  solved for  alternative  levels
of  these exogenous variables.  Therefore, when projections  are  calculated
for  the FAPRI model, predictions about  the  U.S.  general economy  are  pro-
vided by Wharton Forecasting Associates,  and  the model is  solved for  a
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Figure 1.  Linkages Among Commodity Components
in the FAPRI Policy Modeling  System.-15-
1985 Farm Bill,  the FAPRI  model in  this  study was  solved under various
policy regimes.
For more  details on the FAPRI policy model, see FAPRI  Staff Report
#1-85.
Minnesota Agricultural Model
The Minnesota Agricultural model  (MNAG model) consists  of  crop  and
livestock components which reflect  the major markets  in Minnesota's  farm
economy.  The  crops  component  consists of  corn, soybeans  and wheat;  the
livestock component  consists  of  beef,  hogs and dairy.
For each major crop,  there are  four equations  which provide the
Minnesota link to  the FAPRI model.  These involve acreage  planted, acreage
harvested, per acre yield, and  season average  farm price.  For  each
livestock product, there are  two equations providing  the link.  These
involve marketings and average farm prices for  beef and hogs plus produc-
tion and wholesale farm prices  for milk.
Since these  six commodities account  for about  85%  of Minnesota's  farm
marketing cash receipts,  it  was  relatively easy  to  construct a state net
farm income component  in  the MNAG model.  This part  of  the model estimates
Minnesota's  farm income  via  linkages  to Minnesota's  commodity markets,  U.S.
direct government payments,  and  the general U.S.  economy.  The Minnesota
farm income component  produces estimates  of  cash  receipts  from farm marke-
tings,  direct  government payment, other and non-money farm income,  farm
production expenses, and  the  resulting realized gross  and net  farm income.
In  these computations,  realized net  farm income does  not  include  the  value
of  net  inventory  changes.  The latter income measure is  usually  called
total net  farm income.-16-
Figure 2 illustrates  the  components  of  the MNAG model and how  it  is
linked to the  larger FAPRI  model.  Figure 2 also indicates that  the com-
ponents of  the MNAG model  provide a means  for  estimating Minnesota farm
income using information about  general  economic conditions and agricultural
market behavior.FAPRI MODEL  MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL MODEL
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Figure  2..  The Minnesota Agricultural Model and
Linkages  to  the FAPRI  Policy Model-18-
POLICY IMPACTS ON MINNESOTA AGRICULTURE
In this section two  sets of  policy options are discussed,  and their
impact  on the U.S.  and Minnesota farm economy are  presented.  These policy
options were first  incorporated into  the FAPRI  model which projected
national supply, demand,  farm prices and  income for major agricultural com-
modities  out  into the  future  (see FAPRI  Staff Report  #'s  1-85,  5-85 and
7-85).  Then these projections were then entered  into  the MNAG model which
in  turn provided a detailed  projection of Minnesota's  farm economy under
each policy option.  The first  set  of  four options  called  "the Market and
Parity Options" are not  actual  farm bill proposals.  They are stylzed or
generic options which reflect a range  of  the general  types  of  farm policies
and future scenarios  that  characterize much of  the  recent  debate in Congress
and elsewhere.  The second  set  reflect  more closely two specific proposals.
The proposals  are directly comparable within each set,  but not  across  the
two  sets  because somewhat different  basic assumptions  about general economic
conditions were made  by FAPRI  analysts  for each  set.
The Market to Parity Options  (Set  1)
The farm policy options  selected here  by FAPRI were  intended  to  reflect
the  common  themes that  were found  in the  numerous bills  proposed for  the
1985  Farm Bill.  These policy options  are  not  actual farm bill proposals,
but stylized versions constructed after reviewing alternative  proposals and
sorting them by  essential features.
The policy options to  be  evaluated here are  termed  1) the Baseline,
2) the Market Option, 3) the Expanded Export Baseline,  and 4) the  80 Percent
of Parity Option.  A brief description of  these stylized  policy options  are
as follows:-19-
- The  "Baseline":  A continuation of  the  current policy under moderate
to positive conditions for  the U.S.  and world economies with minimum
loan and target  rates set  at 1984-85  levels.
- The "Market Option":  A minimum government intervention policy under
moderate  to positive  conditions  for  the U.S.  and world economies  and
with loan rates  moving more toward world market  prices and  an elimi-
nation of  the  target  price.
- The  "Expanded Export  Baseline":  A continuation of  the current  policy
under more optimistic conditions  for  the U.S.  and world economies  and
with minimum loan and target  rates set  at  1984/85  levels.
- The  "80 Percent of  Parity Option":  Farm prices set  at 80  percent  of
parity, production controls  through a mandatory quota system  to  set
retail prices consistent with farm price parity levels,  and moderate
to positive conditions  for U.S.  and world economies.
Summary of Estimated U.S.  Impacts
Under a continuation of  the  1981  farm program (Baseline) through 1990,
U.S.  annual net  farm income is  expected to  fluctuate  between $20  billion and
over $25  billion  (see table  1).  Cash receipts  from farm marketings are
expected to rise gradually  as  farm prices rise  above  fixed loan rates  and
moderate to strong acreage  control provisions  constrain acreage planted.
With these acreage control provisions, government direct payments are
expected to fall from $5.73  billion in  1986  to $3.29  billion in  1989,  and
then rise up  to  $4.28 billion in  1990.
A contination of  the  1981  farm program under a more  expanded export
scenario  (Export) adds  little  to net  farm income due  to only mild increases
in  farm cash receipts  and smaller direct government payments.  Cash receipts
from farm marketings  are  slightly larger than  in  the Baseline scenario since
any increases in market prices  due  to expanded exports are  moderated by
large  carryover stocks.  Direct government payments are  less  under  the
Export  scenario than under the Baseline scenario  because  less  costly paid
diversion provisions  are  required since  the  stronger export growth takes up*  ..  . . . . . . . . *  *  *  4..  ,  .
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some  of  the excess  supply  capacity.
The free market option  (Market) eliminates all acreage reduction and
paid diversion programs as well as  target  price protection, and  lowers  the
loan rate to free  market levels.  The impact  of  such a scenario is  to
substantially  reduce net  farm  income  because of  lower farm cash  receipts in
response to  depressed farm prices  and  the elimination of  direct  government
payments.  An exports expansion under this  scenario depends  substantially on
the  strength of  the  U.S.  dollar;  a strong U.S.  dollar translates  low U.S.
farm prices  into high commodity prices  overseas,  reducing our  com-
petitiveness.
The  80%  of  parity option (Parity) would raise U.S.  net  farm income  from
$25.73  billion in 1985 to  $81.15 billion in  1990  by  raising farm prices to
80%  of  parity through mandatory marketing quotas.  The results  show  that
such an option would effectively stifle U.S.  exports and would make U.S.
agriculture ntuch more  domestically oriented.  The analysis  also reveals  that
consumer expenditures  on  food would  increase 25  percent  over  the baseline
scenario and  the idling  of  120  to  125 million acres  of  cropland under the
mandatory marketing quota would reduce input use  by  $10  to  $15  billion.
Summary of Estimated Impacts  in Minnesota
The economic impact  of  the baseline, market,  export  and parity policy
options  on Minnesota's  farm economy are  presented in this  section (see
tables 2-6).  Since the  data that went into  the MNAG model to produce the
Minnesota farm income  pojections under these four policy  options  came  from a
FAPRI  staff report released in January of  1985,  the Minnesota projections
appeared  to be overly  optimistic.  This  is  because U.S.  export  conditions
have deteriorated somewhat for  corn and wheat since January.  Therefore, we-22-
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recommend that  comparisions be  confined mainly to  relative changes  across
policy options and time, rather  than on actual levels  of projected prices
and  incomes.
Under the  continuation of  the  1981  farm program (B),  realized net farm
income  (which does not  include  the value  of net  changes  in commodity
inventories) deteriorates  substantially as  it  falls  below farm production
expenses  in 1988  and 1989.  This drop  in realized net  farm income  is  due to
farm production expenses  growing 18%  from 1986  to  1989  and  gross farm income
growing at a slower  rate of  only 8.1%.
Under the expanded export  scenario, the  1981  farm program is  extended
under more optimistic export  conditions.  The results  indicate that  farm
income  is  only  slightly better than under  the baseline  option.  Cash
receipts from farm marketings  increasingly  rises above the  baseline option
by only 0.34%  in 1986 to  2.60% in  1989.  This negligible increase in  farm
cash receipts was  a result of  only mild increases in corn and wheat prices
with corresponding results  for  acreage planted.  Direct government payments
to Minnesota farmers were less under the export  option as  no paid diversion
was  needed  in 1987/88 and  1989/90 for  corn and  1988/89  for wheat since
carryover stocks were reduced by  the expanded exports.
The market option  (M)  produced  drastic results  for Minnesota as  gross
farm income dropped increasingly below production expenses from 1986  to  1989.
Cash receipts  from farm marketing averaged  below baseline  levels  due prin-
cipally to falling farm prices and negligible  increases in production.
Direct  government payments  are  zero over the  1986 to  1989  period as  loan
rates,  target  price protection,  and paid diversions are eliminated.  Farm
production expenses are expected  to  be slightly  larger than the baseline-29-
estimates since more acreage  is  planted under the market option as  set
asides and paid diversions are  eliminated.  Hence, a less  than one percent
projected increase in gross  farm income  between 1983  and 1989  coupled
with a 35.45% increase in farm production expenses over the  same period
yields the worst of  the  four scenarios  for Minnesota farmers.
The  last  of  the farm policy  options,  the  80 percent  of  parity pricing
with a mandatory marketing quota  (P),  projects  a healthy 262% increase in
realized net  farm income  for Minnesota from  1984  to  1989.  Cash receipts
from farm marketings account  for most  of  this  income  boost as  parity pricing
substantially  increases  the  value  of  commodities going  to market even though
production is  reduced substantially.  Direct government  payments to
Minnesota farmers under  this  scenario would be  zero as  a very highly  regu-
lated market would equate a significantly reduced  supply with domestic
demand (plus a quickly declining export  market) to  yield parity prices.
Supply would  be  reduced by law and a mandatory policing mechanism, not by a
voluntary diversion program with payments.  Other  farm income,  the value  of
income from custom work, machine hire and recreation, would be  reduced
substantially  under the parity scenario as  the  reductions  in acreage  planted
to  the major  crops would reduce custom hiring opportunities  by  approximately
23%  per year  over the projected period.
Farm production expenses  for the  parity option are  projected to  fall
(on average) approximately 8.3%  below production expenses under the  baseline
policy option.  This  is  to be  expected as  the  results  indicate that  on
average 5,397,500  aces per year will  be  taken out of  corn,  soybean and wheat
production in Minnesota between 1986 and  1989  when compared to  1984  planted
acreage levels  (15,185,000 acres).-30-
Hence, it should be noted that  the parity program depicted here would
have  to be  enacted at  the federal level with mandatory marketing quotas for
all.  Program costs  involve mainly  the implementing and regulating of  the
program.  The benefit  to Minnesota would be  the parity  income  that  farmers
would receive;  the disadvantage would be  the  loss  of  input use resulting
from reducing major  crop acreage approximtely 35.5%  per year from 1984
levels, with similar reductions in  livestock production.
A similar program also has  been considered for Minnesota in  the form of
a minimum pricing  scheme.  Let us  consider the implications  of  such a
program implemented at  the state  level if  a federal version of a parity
program were not enacted  in the  1985 Farm Bill.  Parity pricing legislation
could be implemented at  the state  level in one of  two ways:  a) Minnesota
farm prices would be set  at high parity levels  by  law if  a number of  states
producing  the majority of U.S.  farm commodities would pass similar  legisla-
tion,  or b) Minnesota farmers could be  subsidized by  the state treasury in
the  amount of  the difference  between parity prices  and  the higher of  federal
price supports  or market  prices  on all production.
In a) above, such a scenario would be  possible under proposed legisla-
tion only if  enough states  enact similar  legislation bringing the majority
of U.S.  commodity production under minimum price protection.  If  only a few
states holding a minority of  U.S.  commodity production prassed parity
legislation, then  the non-parity  states would market their production first
leaving the parity  states  "holding the bag."  In b) above,  the Minnesota
treasury would subsidize  farmers in  amounts that  probably would be  prohibi-
tive,  table 7.  Imagine that  the  1981  farm program is  extended in  1986  and
the Minnesota Legislature passes an 80%  parity minimum pricing law whereby-31-
Table 7.  Minnesota  80% Parity Pricing Program with Manditory Set-Asides
for  1986*
Commodity  Diversion Rate**  Parity Rate  Direct Program Cost
Corn  30%  $1.41/bu  $687,049,290
Soybeans  39%  $5.24/bu  $589,872,040
Wheat  45%  $2.54/bu  $183,934,100
Cattle and Calves  10%  $58.19/cwt  $970,871,055
Hogs  18%  $47.86/cwt  $600,643,000
Milk  16%  $11. 8 9/cwt  $1,016,951,700
Total Cost  $4,049,321,185
* Program assumes continuation of  the  1981  Farm Bill at  the federal level. Diversion rate set  on 1985  production and marketing levels.  Payment  rate set at  the difference between  parity prices and  the higher of  federal
target prices or market  prices.  Minnesota farmers eligible  for parity pricing if they join the  federal farm program.
** Diversion rate on production for  crops and milk;  on marketings for cattle and calves  and hogs.-32-
farmers would be subsidized by  the state  if  they agreed to a preset minimum
average diversion rate which would include  any diversion provisions  in the
1985 Farm Bill.  From the  data provided  in table 7, one  can see  that  the
cost  of  such a state program could be  over $4.05 billion.  Such  a program
may not  be  considered by  the  state because  of  its prohibiive costs,  but  such
scenarios  can be run with the MNAG model for  discussion.
The Administration Proposal and the Market Repayment Option (Set  2)
The next  set of  policy  options  to  be  evaluated was  the Reagan
Administration's  Agricultural Adjustment Act of  1985  (AAA85), and  its  alter-
native,  the market  loan or  variable loan  repayment  proposal  (VLRP).
According to  a FAPRI Staff Report  (April 1985,  p.ii),  "The essential dif-
ference between the AAA85  and VLRP  options  for the Farm Bill is  that the
VLRP provides a more cushioned  transition to a free market  for U.S.  agri-
culture."  This comparison also holds  for Minnesota's projected  farm income
behavior.
Other essential differences between the AAA85  and  the VLRP  are:
1)  Loan rates under the AAA85 are  75%  of a 3 year moving average  of
national farm prices;  the VLRP  freezes  loan rates  at  fixed levels.
2)  Loan rates under the AAA85 are  non-recource in nature  (farmers  can
forfeit grain to  the  CCC  in full  payment  for  the  loan);  loan rates under  the
VLRP  must be  paid back  at  the  loan rate  or  the  market price, which ever is
lower.  Thus, under the VLRP,  government  removals  to  support farm prices
through CCC  aquisitions  or  the farmer held reserve  are eliminated.
3)  Target prices under  the AAA85  decline from 100%  of  a 3-year moving
average  of  national farm prices  for  1986/87,  to  75%  for each year after
1991;  the VLRP freezes  loan rates  at  fixed levels.-33-
4)  Acreage reductions with no paid diversions are  manditory under the
AAA85;  acreage reductions as well  as  paid diversions are used under the VLRP
whenever excess  capacity needs  to  be managed.
5)  The acreage  base under  the AAA85 program is  adjusted using a three
year moving average  of actual plantings;  the acreage  base under  the VLRP
is  determined as  under the  1981 Farm Bill.
Summary of Estimated U.S.  Impacts
The FAPRI  evaluation of  the AAA85 and  the VLRP  proposals  indicates  that
price paths under the two  programs for wheat,  corn and soybeans  are  similar
but higher for  the VLRP  due  to its  stronger paid diversion incentives.
Prices under both options  fall below 1985/86  levels  because  both programs
essentially remove  the  loan rate floor.  Prices  then rebound  in 1988/89  and
1989/90  in response to  increased feed grain use  for livestock and a stronger
export demand.
The government cost  figures  reveal that  the VLRP  is  more costly than
the AAA85 option, but  results  in a stronger  farm income  situation which is
held  constant near an estimated 1985  level  (see table 8).  Direct  government
payments under the VLRP ranged from $6.1  billion in 1986 to  $5.8  billion in
1990, with farm income falling from a high of  $27.3  billion in  1987  to a low
of  $21.6  billion in 1990.  On  the  other hand, direct government payments
under the AAA85  program declined from $4.75 billion in  1986 to zero  in  1989,
with net  farm income fluctuating between $13.50  and $21.13  billion  between
1986 and  1990.
In general, the VLRP  option produced higher and  more stable farm
income  levels  at higher government  costs  than did  the AAA85  or  free market
proposal.  However, because this  FAPRI  report was  released in April of-34-
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1985, we would expect  the disparity between  the  two  programs  (in terms of
farm prices and net farm income)  to be  even greater if  the same  analysis was
conducted under current market  conditions.  The  export situation has
deteriorated substantially  since April, and one  could expect  farm prices  and
income to fall under the relatively  less  protected AAA85 proposal from VLRP
levels.
Summary of Estimated Impacts  in Minnesota
The economic impact of  the AAA85 and VLRP proposals on Minnesota's  farm
economy are  discussed and presented in  this  section.  As mentioned earlier,
the MNAG model uses  national projections from the FAPRI  policy model as
input  into the modeling activity.  Minnesota estimates  for  the  1985  crop and
calendar year were  based on an August 12,  1985 USDA release for estimated
Minnesota corn, soybeans,  and wheat yields,  and  the July  1985 FAPRI  Staff
Report #7-85.  Projections for Minnesota's  farm economy under the VLRP  and
AAA85 proposals  from 1986  to  1989 were  based on  the March and April 1985
FAPRI Staff Reports  #3-85 and #5-85,  respectively.
Our analysis with the MNAG model reveals  that crop prices  for  the  1985
marketing year are estimated  to be  $2.41,  $5.41,  and  $3.53  per  bushel for
corn, soybeans  and wheat, respectively  (see tables 9, 10  and  11).  Crop  pri-
ces under  both the AAA85 and VLRP  scenarios  are  expected to  drop in  1986/87
and rise in 1989/90  and beyond in response  to stronger  livestock feed  and
export demand.
FAPRI  has  estimated livestock prices to  be  the same under the VLRP  and
AAA85 proposals.  Cattle  prices  rise from $55.83  per  c.w.t.  in  1985  to
$57.08  in 1986,  and  then fall  to  $53.30  in  1989.  Pork prices  decline from
$51.57  per  c.w.t.  to  $38.75 in  1987  (in response  to  lower  feed prices),  and-36-
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then pull up  to $43.36  in 1989.  Beef  has a longer production  cycle  than do
hogs,  and prices  over the  projection period are determined more  by  the  beef
cycle  than by  changes  in input prices.  Dairy prices under these two  scen-
arios  rise from a low  of  $11.89  per  c.w.t.  in 1986  to $13.72  in 1989.
The USDA has estimated Minnesota's  cash receipts  from farm marketings
to  be  $6.08  billion for  1984.  However, the MNAG model  has projected $6.34
billion for  1984  with a corresponding $7.46  billion  in gross  farm income  and
$849.80 million in realized net  farm income.  In  1985,  projected realized
net  farm income is expected  to drop  1.6%  from 1984  to  $836.6 million.  In an
earlier analysis,  projected realized net  farm income  for  1985 was  calculated
to  be $749.14 million.  However, a rise  in expected corn and wheat yields  to
110 and 46.5  bushels per acre, respectively  has  contributed significantly to
a projected $6.5  billion  in cash  receipts, which represents a 2.65%  rise
from 1984  levels.
Looking at  the projected period 1986  to  1989,  realized net  farm income
is  expected to  drop  from $836.58 million in 1985  to a negative $502.42
million in  1989  under the  VLRP option, as  production expenses  overtake
realized gross by  1988.  Likewise, realized net  farm income  is  expected  to
decline even more sharply  to a negative  $854.80 million under  the AAA85
option, as  farm production expenses  overtake  realized gross as  early as  1987.
Cash receipts  from farm marketings over  the projected period  1986 to
1989 are  generally greater under  the VLRP option  than under the AAA85
option.  Stronger  control provisions and resulting higher prices would allow
Minnesota farmers  to  realize a greater market  return for  their products
under the VLRP  than under the AAA85 proposal.  Direct  government payments
under the  VLRP  option are significantly greater  than under the AAA85  option.-42-
Government payments  decline  from $399.71  million to  $255.89 million between
1986  and 1989  under the VLRP  option, but  rapidly decline  to zero in  1988
under the AAA85 option.  In general, farm income for Minnesota is  greater
under the VLRP  option  than under the AAA85 option, but  it  is  certainly not
more  stable  as was true with the FAPRI analysis  at  the national level.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Two  sets of policy options were analyzed by  the MNAG model for
Minnesota's  farm economy using FAPRI  Staff Report  releases.  Under the  first
set,  four stylized policy options were  described and analyzed by  the MNAG
model.  They were:  the baseline  (B),  or  continuation of  the  1981  Farm Bill,
the market option  (M), the  expanded export  baseline  (E),  and the  80  percent
of  parity option  (P).  The results generally  indicated that  realized net
farm income under options B, M and E are  expected  to  fall rather dramati-
cally  in response to falling commodity prices  and  rising production expen-
ses.  The 80 percent  of  parity option is  the only scenario  that  shows an
increasing realized net  farm income over  the  projected period.  In  fact,
realized net  farm income  is projected  to increase 262%  from 1984  to  1989
with the mandatory marketing quota requiring  strict output  reductions.
However, all is not  rosy with  the parity option  as  custom hiring oppor-
tunities are projected  to be  reduced by  23%  a year, and an average  of  5.4
million acres  per year will be  taken out  of  crop production  in Minnesota
over the projected period.
In the second set  of  policy options analyzed  by  the MNAG model,  the
Reagan Administration's  proposal (AAA85) was  compared to  the market  loan
option, or variable loan  repayment program  (VLRP).  Farm prices under the
VLRP  option were found  to  be stronger  than under the AAA85  option due  to-43-
greater paid diversion incentives which help  to manage  excess supply con-
ditions.  These greater  supply control provisions in  the VLRP option also
accounted for  continued income support  in  the form of  direct government
payments  and reduced production expenses.  The  results  for Minnesota indi-
cate a higher  realized net  farm income under the  VLRP  program than under  the
AAA85.  However, even with direct government payments  declining  from $400 to
$256  million under the VLRP  option from 1986  to  1989,  realized net  farm
income  for Minnesota still declines  to a negative $502 million in  1989  as
realized gross farm income drops below production expenses in 1988 and  1989.
In conclusion, the  outcome of  the  1985  farm bill debate will affect
Minnesota farmers well  into  the  next decade.  The major farm bill proposals
discussed in  this paper all claim in  one way or  another to a) maintain or
raise net  farm income,  and b) lower government farm program costs.  Given
the  FAPRI and MNAG analyses,  the major proposals  can be  evaluated in terms
of winners  and losers  in Minnesota's  farm economy.  Some of  the major ele-
ments  in  this  analysis  are:  farmers,  grain handlers and input dealers,  the
federal budget  deficit,  and consumers.
The Administration's  proposal claims  to  take government out  of  agri-
culture and return  the sector  to a free market.  According to our  analysis,
Minnesota farmers would clearly  lose under this  option as  farm prices  and
incomes are  projected to fall.  This would force many more farmers  out  of
business.  The winners under this  option would be  the federal  budget  deficit
and consumers.  A transition to  a free market would help reduce  the future
size  of  the federal deficit,  and would continue to  provide relatively  cheap
food to American consumers  and foreign  buyers.
At the other extreme,  the Farm Policy Reform Act,  or parity  bill, would
require farmers after a referendum  to  subject  themselves  to  strict marketing-44-
quotas for which they would receive in  return parity loan  rates.  Such a
proposal would certainly benefit  farmers  by  assuring quota holders  stable
farm prices  and a parity return on their farm marketings.  The federal defi-
cit would be  lowered under a well managed quota system (meaning supply  suf-
ficiently refuced from current levels).  This  is  because budgetary exposure
would be  significantly reduced with the elimination  of  target  price def-
ficiency  payments and paid acreage diversions.  The  losers under  this
option would be grain handlers,  input dealers, and consumers.  Grain
handlers,  such as  grain elevators  and barge operators, would  lose as  the
supply of grain available  on  the market is  reduced.  Input  dealers,  such as
seed, fertilizer, machinery, and  chemical dealers, would lose as  acreage
planted is  reduced in response  to marketing quotas.  Consumers would also
lose  as higher food and  feed  grain prices would raise  the  cost of meat  and
other products.
We hope that the  anslysis provided in  this  paper will aid Minnesota
policy makers by  providing  them, and  the public, with objective, credible
and  reliable information useful in analyzing the possible  policy options  for
the 1985  farm bill and  beyond.-45-
FOOTNOTES
1)  The 1984  and 985  estimations  for Minnesota are based on  an August  12,
1985 USDA release for estimated corn,  soybean and wheat yields  for
Minnesota, and  the July  1985 FAPRI  Staff Report  #7-85.  The  1986  to  1989
Minnesota projection is  based on  the Janary  1985  FAPRI  Staff Report  #1-85.-46-
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APPENDIX A
THE MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL MODEL:  A SUMMARY-48-
THE MODEL
The following sections  briefly describe and  present the equations
which were developed  to link  the national FAPRI model with the Minnesota
agricultural sector.  They encompass  the  crop  and livestock enterprises
that  contribute the  bulk  of  the state's farm income:  corn,  soybeans,
wheat, cattle  and calves, hogs,  and dairy.  In addition to  the commodity
linkage equations, we  also present  the  relations which allow us  to  estimate
gross and net  farm income  for Minnesota.
The  technical presentation of  the  estimated equations  include  the
R  statistic which indicates  the  proportion of  total variation in the
dependent  (left hand) variable which  is  accounted for  by  systematic
variation in the  independent  (right hand) variables,  considered jointly.
The numbers in parenthesis below the estimated equation coefficients  are
the computed t-ratios.  These values  indicate  the  relative strength  of  the
coefficients  in a statistical sense.  All equations were estimated with
crop  year data from the  1961-1983  period.-49-
CORN
The corn component of  the Minnesota's  Agricultural Model  (MNAG  model)
consists  of  four  equations estimating acreage planted and harvested, yield,
and the season average farm price.  In  the  first equation, Minnesota corn
acreage planted (CRPTMN) was estimated as  a function of  U.S.  corn acreage
(CORSA).  Considering that Minnesota acreage  is  measured in thousands  and
U.S.  acreage is  in millions,  the  coefficient  on CORSA implies  that
Minnesota accounts for approximately 8.5%  of  all U.S.  corn acreage planted,
on average.  In  the second  equation, Minnesota corn acreage harvested
(CRHRMN) was estimated as  a function of Minnesota corn acreage planted and
yield (CRYDMN).  It  was  assumed that  as  yields  decrease, more acres  are
harvested for  silage and less for grain.  Likewise, as  yields  improve,  less
planted acres are abandoned from harvest.  On average, Minnesota farmers
harvest approximately 85%  of  their planted corn acreage.
The third equation estimates Minnesota corn yields  (CRYDMN) with a
linear trend variable  (TREND).  The coefficient  on TREND  suggests  that  corn
yields  in Minnesota increase at  an average  rate of  1.81  bushels per year.
Any yields  projected from this  equation assume "normal" weather -- climatic
conditions  that neither improve nor worsen yields  from their trend
average).  Finally, Minnesota's  season average farm price for corn  (CRPFMN)
was estimated as  a function of  the  U.S.  season  average farm price  for  corn
(CORPF).  The coefficient  on CORPF suggests  that Minnesota's  corn price  is
on average 5.68%  lower than the U.S.  season average farm price.-50-
The estimated corn model is  as  follows:
R2
CRPTMN  =  85.6  CORSA  0.89
(110.2)
CRHRMN  =  9.20 CRYDMN + 0.73 CRPTMN  0.96
(4.1)  (24.6)
CRYDMN  =  59.97 + 1.81  TREND  0.50
(11.2)  (4.6)
CRPFMN  =  0.94 CORPF  0.99
(171.6)
Note:  the  numbers  in  brackets are  the t-statistics.-51-
SOYBEANS
The soybean component of Minnesota's  crop sector  is  similar to  the
corn model and contains the  same number of  equations.  In the  first
equation, Minnesota soybean acreage planted (SYPTMN) was estimated as  a
function of U.S.  soybean acrease (SOYSA) and Minnesota corn acreage planted
(CRPTMN).  We assume  here that  if  spring weather conditions interfere with
normal corn planting, some  farmers will switch to  soybeans since soybeans
require a shorter growing season than  corn.  In the second equation,
Minnesota soybean acreage harvested  (SYHRMN) was  estimated as  a function of
Minnesota soybean acreage planted.  The  coefficient on SYPTMN  indicates
that Minnesota farmers  harvest on average 98.5%  of  soybean acreage planted
for harvest.  Note that  the harvested acres  equation for  soybeans does not
contain the yield variable as  in  the  corn equation.  Soybean yield was  sta-
tistically significant  in these equations.  This  is  not understandable
because soybean farmers  do  not  have the alternative that  corn growers have
to use  the  crop for  silage.
Minnesota soybean yield  (SYYDMN) was  estimated in the  third equation
as a function of  linear  trend  (TREND).  Soybean yields  increase on average
0.66 bushels per year.
In the  last equation the season average  farm price  for Minnesota
soybeans  (SYPFMN) was estimated as  a function of  the U.S.  season average
farm price  (SOYPF).  The statistical  results  indicate that Minnesota beans
sell at  on average  1.12%  discount  to the  U.S.  season average farm price.
The model is presented below:-52-
R2
SYPTMN  =  1627.7 + 62.3  SOYSA - 0.17  CRPTMN  0.88
(3.1)  (10.1)  (-1.6)
SYHRMN  =  0.98 SYPTMN  0.99
(462.5)
SYYDMN  =  18.4  + 0.66 TREND  0.64
(12.4)  (6.1)
SYPFMN  =  0.99 SOYPF  0.99
(126.8)-53-
WHEAT
Minnesota produces  predominantly hard red  spring wheat, with  large
amounts grown in  the northwestern and west  central districts of  the state.
Minnesota wheat acreage  represents approximately  12%  of  the hard red spring
wheat belt in  the northcentral region of  the United States  and  typically
averages 3% of  all wheat varieties  grown in  the United States.
The  first equation in  the wheat model estimates Minnesota wheat
acreage planted (WHPTMN) as  a function of  a linear trend variable  (TREND)
and U.S. wheat acreage planted  (WHESA).  The  trend variable was used  to
capture the  increase in Minnesota's share  of national wheat acreage  that
has  occurred over the historical  period.  The next  equation estimated
Minnesota wheat acreage harvested  (WHHRMN) to  be  95.9%  of Minnesota wheat
acreage planted.  No yield variable was used in  this equation for wheat
since no relatively high value alternatives  are available for wheat  not
harvested for grain.
Minnesota wheat yield (WHYDMN) was estimated  in the  third equation as
a function of  a linear trend  (TREND).  The coefficient  on the  trend
variable suggests  that wheat yields  increase an average of  0.65 bushels  per
year.  The final equation estimates the Minnesota season average  farm price
for wheat  (WHRMN) to  be a function of  the  U.S.  season average farm price
(WHRPR).  The statistical results  indicate that Minnesota's wheat  at  the
farm averages 6.2%  above  the national season average farm price.  This
result  occurs  because hard wheat sells at  a premium to soft wheat
varieties.  The statistical  results  are as  follows:-54-
R2
WHPTMN  =  -2457.2 + 57.2  TREND + 58.1  WHESA  0.84
(-3.3)  (2.1)  (3.9)
WHHRMN  =  0.96 WHPTMN  0.99
(124.9)
WHYDMN  =  23.8 + 0.65 TREND  0.63
(15.9)  (6.0)
WHPFMN  =  1.06 WHEPF  0.98
(103.3)-55-
CATTLE AND CALVES
The cattle and calves component  of  the  livestock subsector  consists  of
two equations, a marketing and farm price equation.  Statistical attempts
to  link Minnesota cattle and calf  marketings  to U.S. marketing and produc-
tion have not  succeeded.  Minnesota's  cattle market seems  to moves  inde-
pendly  of  the U.S.  market primarily  because  of  the influence  of  the  dairy
industry on marketings.  Therefore, Minnesota cattle and calf  marketings
(CCMKMN) was  linked to Minnesota production  (CCPDMN), Minnesota cattle  and
calf  numbers lagged one year  (CCNUMS), and the  ratio of  the Omaha slaughter
price of  steers  to the  national season average  farm price for  corn  (CCCR).
Although the R2 statistic is  relatively low,  the estimated coefficients
have  correct signs and high t-ratios,  indicating that  the model generally
captures  the proper direction of  change  but  tends  to underestimate its
magnitude.
In  the second equation,  the Minnesota cattle and calf  price  (CCPFMN)
was estimated to  be at  a 19.2%  discount to  the Omaha  slaughter price
(CTPFFD).  The  cattle model is  as  follows:
R2
CCMKMN  =  -1030.0 + 1.06  CCPDMN + 0.26  CCNUMS(-1)
(-1.8)  (3.4)  (2.6)
+ 14.4 CCCR  0.60
(2.1)
CCPFMN  =  0.81  CTPFFD  0.98
(83.0)-56-
HOGS
The hog model consists  of a marketing and a farm price equation.  In
the  first equation, Minnesota hog marketings  (PKMKMN) was estimated as
a function of U.S,  pork marketing  (PKMKT) and  the  barrows  and gilts  price,
seven city basis  (BGPM7C).  Trend and  trend squared  variables were also
incorporated  into  the  production equation to  account  for  the  apparent  cur-
vature in  the production  trend through time.  In  the second equation,  the
Minnesota season average  farm price for  pork (PKPFMN) was  estimated  as  a
function of  the  seven-city price of  barrows  and gilts  (BGPM7C).  The coef-
ficient on BGPM7C  indicates  that  Minnesota's farm price for  pork averages
3.3%  lower  than the seven-city price.
The statistical results  for  these  two equations are  presented below:
R2
PKMKMN  =  -738.0 + 0.11  PKMKT + 12.3  BGPM7C  0.91 (-2.1)  (6.8)  (2.5)
- 66.9  TREND + 2.17 TRDSQR
(-6.3)  (5.7)
PKPFMN  =  0.97 BGPM7C  0.99
(280.4)-57-
DAIRY
The dairy component  of  the MNAG model consists of  a production and a
farm price equation for milk.  In  the first  equation, Minnesota milk pro-
duction  (MKPDMN) was estimated  as a function of  national milk production
(MILAP), and a linear  trend  (TREND).  State milk production followed
national production  fairly closely, particularly during the expansionary
period of  the latter 70's  and early  80's,  when  the  target  price was rising
rapidly  in response  to runaway  inflation.  The trend variable was utilized
to  capture  the  downward trend  in Minnesota's  milk production from the  early
sixties  to 1975.  The second equation estimated Minnesota's  season average
milk price  (MKPFMN) as  a function of  the  U.S. milk  price  (MILPF).
Minnesota's  milk price averaged 91.3%  of  the U.S.  annual average milk price
over the period of  fit.  The estimated coefficient  on MILPF  seems  to
suggest that Minnesota milk  sells at  a premium to  the national average.
However, a closer look will reveal  that  the model  then reduces  that  figure
$1.05  per  hundred weight, which properly measures Minnesota milk prices to
be  below the national average.
The estimated dairy equations are  as  follows:
R2
MKPDMN  =  728.2 +  81.6  MILAP - 70.0  TREND  0.83
(0.64) (8.6)  (-7.6)
MKPFMN  =  -1.05 + 1.03 MILPF  0.99
(-21.9)(181.4)-58-
MINNESOTA FARM INCOME
The farm income  component  of  the Minnesota Agricultural Model consists
of  five estimated equations which are  used  in the  calculation of  realized
net  farm income.  This model stops short  of  estimating  total net  farm
income because it  lacks an equation to  compute  net  changes  in farm inven-
tories.
In the  first equation, total cash receipts  from farm marketings
(CASHRM) was  estimated as  a function of  (1)  gross  returns  to  corn, soybeans
and wheat  (GRCROP), and  (2) gross returns  to  cattle and calf marketings,
hog marketings,  and  fluid milk production  (GRLIVS).  For a more explicit
definition of GRCROP  and GRLIVS,  see Appendix D.  In  the second equation,
Minnesota's  receipt  of direct  government farm payments  (GOVTPY) was
regressed onto total U.S.  farm program payments  (LACFPG).  The  third
equation estimated the value  of non-money farm income  (NONMI) as  a function
of  the consumer price  index for non-durables  less  food (PCNDF).  Non-money
income represents  the value  of  home  consumption and housing.
Other farm income  (OTHFI) was estimated  in the  fourth equation as  a
function of  acreage planted to  corn, soybeans  and wheat  (PTMN),  and the
consumer price index used in  the  previous equation.  Other farm income
represents  income  from custom work, machine hire,  and recreation.  It was
assumed that  as acreage planted  to  the major crops increased, custom hiring
opportunities  and  income would rise.  And finally, farm production expenses
for Minnesota was estimated as  a function of acreage  planted to  the  major
crops  (PTMN) and  the consumer price index.  It  was  also assumed here  that
PTMN  and production expenses are  directly related.-59-
The statistical results of  the  farm income model for Minnesota are
presented below:
R2
CASHRM  =  -248.8 +  0.66  GRCROP +  1.56  GRLIV  0.99
(-1.7)  (4.2)  (7.4)
GOVTPY  =  0.05  LACFPG  0.89
(21.0)
NONMI  =  -113.4  +  270.5  PCNDF  0.93
(-4.4)  (16.6)
OTHFMI  =  -48.8  +  0.0035  PTMN + 25.3  PCNDF  0.94
(-7.4)  (4.1)  (6.9)
FMPDEX  =  -2291.3  +  0.11  PTMN + 2646.6 PCNDF  0.99
(-15.5)  (6.0)  (32.5)
The calculations  of annual  realized gross and  net  farm income are  as
follows:
RGROFI = CASHRM + GOVTPY + NONMI + OTHFMI
RNETFI = RGROFI - FMPDEX-60-
APPENDIX B--EXOGENOUS DATA UTILIZED
IN THE POLICY PROJECTIONS
MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL MODEL, SCENARIO:  1981  FARM PROGRAM CONTINUATION
EXOGENOUS DATA USED IN  THE PROJECTIONS
TIME  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
CORSA  81.9  82  78  76.9  76.3
CORPF  2.56  . 63  2.87  2.9  2.92
SOYSA  65  67  67.2  67.8  71.5
SOYPF  5.47  6.13  6.63  6.97  6.82
WHESA  75.1  80.1  80.8  81.9  83.1
WHEPF  3.32  3.46  3.66  3.66  3.72
CCPDMN  1441.5  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94
CCNUMS  3,550  3,733  3,833  3,880  3,833
CTPFFD  69.08  72. 00  69.50  68.00  67. 00
PRAP77  14,334  15,904  16,899  16,296  15,859
BGPM7C  53.33  49.50  45.00  49.00  51.00
MILAP  137.8  134.19  132.848  131.519  130.204
MILPF  12.90  12.61  13.18  13.77  14.39
LACFPG  6,000  5,731  4,762  3,341  3,285
PCNDF  2.758  2.838  2.929  3.122  3.303
MINNESOTA  AGRICULTURAL  MODEL, SCENARIO:  MARKET  OPTION
EXOGENOUS  DATA USED  IN THE PROJECTIONS
TIME  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
CORSA  81.9  81.8  81.7  81.5  81.3
CORPF  2.56  2.53  2.49  2.42  2.66
SOYSA  65  66.8  68.3  70.6  73.2
SOYPF  5.47  6.04  6.17  6.22  6.51
WHESA  75.1  82.8  83.6  84.6  85.5
WHEPF  3.32  3.21  3.25  3.32  3.48
CCPDMN  1441.5  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94
CCNUMS  3,550  3,733  3,833  3,880  3,833
CTPFFD  69.08  72.00  70.00  69.50  67.00
PRAP77  14,334  15,904  16,899  16,296  15,859
BGPM7C  53.33  49.50  42.50  46.00  47.50
MILAP  137.8  134.19  132.848  131.519  130.204
MILPF  12.90  12.61  13.18  13.77  14.39
LACFPG  6,000  0  0  0  0
PCNDF  2.758  2.838  2.929  3.122  3.303-61-
APPENDIX  B  (Continued)
MINNESOTA AGRICULTURAL MODEL, SCENARIO:  EXPANDED EXPORT BASELINE
EXOGENOUS DATA USED  IN  THE PROJECTIONS
TIME  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
CORSA  81.9  82  82.6  78.4  81.7
CORPF  2.56  2.67  2.86  2.94  2.95
SOYSA  65  67  67.7  71.3  72.9
SOYPF  5.47  6.2  6.74  7.42  7.45
WHESA  75.1  80.1  80.7  85.9  84.8
WHEPF  3.32  3.49  3.71  3.64  3.81
CCPDMN  1441.5  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94
CCNUMS  3,550  3,733  3,833  3,880  3,833
CTPFFD  69.08  72.00  69.50  68.00  67.00
PRAP77  14,334  15,904  16,899  16,296  15,859
BGPM7C  53.33  49.50  45.00  49.00  51.00(
MILAP  137.8  134.19  132.848  131.519  130.2)04
MILPF  12.90  12.61  13.18  13.77  14.39
LACFPG  6,000  5,377  3,802  3,183  2,  306
PCNDF  2.758  2.838  2.929  3.122  3.303
MINNESOTA  AGRICULTURAL  MODEL,  SCENARIO:  80  PERCENT  OF  PARITY
EXOGENOUS  DATA USED  IN  THE PROJECTIONS
TIME  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
CORSA  81.9  57  57  57.3  58
CORPF  2.56  4.71  4.91  5.08  5.23
SOYSA  65  39.1  40.7  41.2  41.4
SOYPF  5.47  11.43  11.93  12.35  12.72
WHESA  75.1  48.5  41.6  39.5  39.6
WHEPF  3.32  6.  6.6.82  7.07  7.28
CCPDMN  1441.5  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94
CCNUMS  3,550  3,733  3,833  3,880  3,833
CTPFFD  69.08  75.34  89.47  93.23  96.21
PRAP77  14,334  15,904  16,899  16,296  15,859
BGPM7C  53.33  56.31  80.46  83.83  86.52
MILAP  137.8  118.269  117.559  116.854  116.153
MILPF  12.90  19.78  20.37  20.98  21.61
LACFPG  6, 000  0  0  0
PCNDF  2.758  2.838  2.929  3.122  3.303-62-
APPENDIX  B  (Continued)
MINNESOTA AGRICULTURFL MODEL, SCENARIO:  P  VLRP
EXOGENOUS DATA USED  IN THE  PROJECTIONS
TIME  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
CORSA  81.9  80.3  79.6  79.4  79.3
CORPF  2.56  2.31  2.23  2.41  2.59
SOYSA  65  65.8  67.3  67.2  68.4
SOYPi  5.47  5.56  5.19  5.71  6.25
WHESA  75.1  8.  9  82.5  83.1  84.4
WHEPF  3.32  3.28  3.18  3.3  3.31
CCPDMN  1441.5  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94
CCNUMS  3,550  3,733  3.833  3,880  3,833
CTPFFD  69.  08  7(0.  63  69.  16  6.  08  65.96
PRAP77  14,334  15,904  16,899  16,296  15,859
BGPM7C  53.33  47.20  40.07  42.94  44.84
MILAP  137.8  134.19  132.848  131.519  130.204
MIL.PF  12.90  12.61  13.18  13.77  14.33
LACFPG  6,000  7,60C4  7,  024  6,185  4,868
PCNDF  2.758  2.838  2.929  3.122  3.  3)3
MINNESOTA  AGRICULTURAL  MODEL,  SCENARIO:  AAA85
EXOGENOUS  DATA USED  IN  THE  PROJECTIONS
TIME  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
CORSA  81.9  81.1  80.1  79.6  79.7
CORPF  2.56  2.18  2.22  2.18  2.44
SOYSA  65  66.5  67.4  68.5  67.9
SOYPF  5.47  5.32  5.08  5.14  5.8
WHESA  75.1  79.7  80.2  81  83.3
WHEPF  3.32  3.17  3.09  3.13  3.3
CCPDMN  1441.5  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94  1447.94
CCNUMS  3,550  3,733  3,833  3,880  3,833
CTPFFD  69. 08  70.63  69.16  69.08  65.96
PRAP77  14,334  15,904  16,899  16,296  15,859
BGPM7C  53.33  47.  20  40.07  42.  94  44.84
MILAP  137.8  134.19  132.848  131.519  130.204
MILPF  12.90  12.61  13.18  13.77  14.39
LACFPG  6,000  4,578  721  0  0
PCNDF  2.758  2.838  2.929  3.122  3.303-63-
APPENDIX C--IDENTITIES
CCCR  =  CTPFFD/CORPF
GRCROP  =  GRCORN + GRSOYB + CRWHT
where  GRCORN = (CRHRMN * CRYDMN  * CRPFMN)/1,000
GRSOYB = (SYHRMN * SYYDMN  * SYPRMN)/1,000
GRWHT  = (WHHRMN * WHYDMN * WHPFMN)/1,000
GRLIVS  =  GRMILK + GRPORK + GRCC
where  GRMILK = (MKPDMN * MKPFMN)/100
GRPORK = (PKMKMN * PKPFMN)/100
GRCC = (CCMKMN * CCPFMN)/100
PTMN  =  CRPTMN + SYPTMN + WHPTMN
RGROFI = CASHRM + GOVTPY + NONMI + OTHFMI
RNETFI = RGROFI  - FMPDEX
TRDSQR  = TREND * TREND
TREND  =  1, 2, ... ,  29  for  the  time  period  1961-89-64-
APPENDIX D--VARIABLE DESCRIPTION LIST
Exogenous Variables
BGPM7C:  barrows  and gilts,  price, seven  markets, $/cwt
CORPF:  corn, average farm price, Oct-Sept, U.S.,  $/bu
CORSA:  corn, acreage planted, Oct-Sept, U.S.,  mil acre
CCNUMS:  cattle and  calves,  NUMBERS, Jan 1,  MN,  1000  head
CCPDMN:  cattle and  calves,  production, MN, mil  lbs
CTPFFD:  price of slaughter  steers, Omaha, all w&g,  $/cwt
LACFPG:  total government payments, mil  $
MILAP:  milk, total production, U.S.,  bil  lbs
MILPF:  milk, all wholesale, ave  farm price, U.S.  $/cwt
PCNDF:  CPI, nondurables  less  food,  index  1967=1.0
PKMKT:  pork, marketings,  carcass weight, U.S.,  mil  lbs
SOYPF:  soybeans,  average  farm price, Sept-Aug, U.S.,  $/bu
SOYSA:  soybeans,  acreage  planted, Sept-Aug, U.S.  mil acre
WHEPF:  wheat, average  farm pric,  July-June, U.S.  $/bu
Endogenous Variables
CASHRM:  cash receipts  from farm marketings, MN, mil  $
CCMKMN:  cattle and  calves,  marketings, MN, mil  lbs
CCPFMN:  cattle, average  farm price,  $/cwt
CRHRMN:  corn, acreage harvsted, Oct-Sept, MN,  1,000  acres
CRPFMN:  corn, average  farm price, Oct-Sept, MN,  $/bu
CRPTMN:  corn, acreage planted, Oct-Sept, MN,  1,000  acres
CRYDMN:  corn, yield per harvested acre, Oct-Sept, MN,  bushels
FMPDEX:  farm production expenses, MN, mil $
GOVTPY:  government payments, MN, mil  $
MKPFMN:  milk, all wholesale price, MN,  $/cwt
MKPDMN:  milk, on farm production, MN,  mil lbs
NONMI:  non-money income, MN, mil  $
OTHFMI:  other farm income, MN, mil  $
PKPFMN:  hogs,  average farm price, MN,  $/cwt
PKMKMN:  hogs,  marketings, MN,  mil  lbs
RGROFI:  total realized gross  farm income, MN, mil $
RNETFI:  realized  net  farm income, MN,  mil $
SYHRMN:  soybeans,  acreage harvested, Sept-Aug, MN,  1,000  acres
SYPFMN:  soybeans,  average farm price,  Sept-Aug, MN,  $/bu
SYPTMN:  soybeans,  acreage planted, Sept-Aug, MN,  1,000 acres
SYYDMN:  soybeans, yield per harvested acre, Sept-Aug, MN,  bushels
WHHRMN:  wheat,  acreage harvsted, July-June, MN,  1,000  acres
WHPFMN:  wheat,  average farm price, July-June, MN,  $/bu
WHPTMN:  wheat,  acreage planted, July-June, MN,  1,000  acres
WHYDMN:  wheat,  yield per harvested acre, July-June, MN, bushels